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LAW, MORALITY, AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES. By Terry 
Nardin. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1983. Pp. xii, 
350. Cloth, $35; paper $14.50. 
This unusual book is at once an attempt to revise and refine the 
nineteenth-century conception of international relations and an argu-
ment for its moral superiority to some prominent recent theories of the 
international system. Professor Nardin, an associate professor of 
political science at the State University of New York in Buffalo, claims 
that the statements of shared purposes in the United Nations Charter 
and in the programs of movements like the New International Eco-
nomic Order misstate the basis for international association and 
misapprehend the nature of moral conduct in international affairs. 
Professor Nardin's argument falls short in several respects and his 
tone is occasionally a bit strident, but this spirited defense of a contro-
versial position should stimulate discussion among theorists of inter-
national law and jurisprudence. 
Nardin begins by positing a distinction between "purposive" and 
"practical" associations of states. Purposive associations exist to fur-
ther shared goals or ends: the abolitionist movement in America was 
an example of a purposive association of individuals dedicated to end-
ing slavery. Practical associations, on the other hand, are based on 
rules or practices that are "proper to be observed in acting, regardless 
of one's end" (p. 8). One example of a practical association might be a 
debating society, in which the members may not share any political 
goals but are willing to follow common rules of debate. 
Nardin argues that international society is emphatically the latter 
kind of association, a practical association of states based on a few 
shared rules and practices. It is "an association of independent and 
diverse political communities, each devoted to its own ends and its 
own conception of the good, often related to one another by nothing 
more than the fragile ties of a common tradition of diplomacy" (p. 19). 
He rejects the idea that states associate with other states in order to 
further goals of world peace or economic justice, arguing that such a 
notion is logically incomplete, historically inaccurate, and morally 
questionable. 
Nardin's argument from logic is not very satisfying. For Nardin, 
the purposive conception of international society is logically incom-
plete because its proponents "forget that any international agreement 
presupposes commonly acknowledged rules and procedures according 
to which agreements can be made" (p. 24). 1 The idea here is that no 
1. This classic formalist argument appears in different guises again and again in the book. 
See, e.g., p. 172 ("Pacta sunt servanda is a rule of customary international law and not itself the 
product of explicit agreement, for if it were one would have to ask why the agreement to respect 
agreements should itself be respected."); p. 194 ("The view that there is no law apart from what 
officials decide is indeed self-contradictory, for the very idea of an official presupposes rules ac-
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association can be purely purposive: some kind of practical associa-
tion, some set of rules independent of the common goals and accepted 
by all, must lie behind a purposive association if it is to act at all. Even 
an anarchists' convention needs procedural laws, or else no one can 
say when the group has agreed. Yet this does not prove that interna-
tional society is not purposive - just that it must be practical as well. 
Nardin's developed theory of the practical association of states must 
go beyond this weak formalism. 
Professor Nardin's historical and political argument is stronger: 
the "practical" conception of international society can better account 
for the actual diversity of ends in the world and can generally provide 
a more satisfactory explanation of international law. His analysis of 
the history of international relations is perhaps the most interesting 
and valuable section in the book. Nardin combines intellectual and 
social history by exploring the tension between practical and purposive 
conceptions of international law both in the theories of Kant and Ben-
tham and in the actual workings of nineteenth-century and twentieth-
century international organizations. His treatment of the Concert of 
Europe (pp. 86-97) is particularly good. Historians have viewed the 
Concert as both an instrument of collective interests and as a set of 
practices designed to achieve security and stability among nineteenth-
century European states regardless of their individual goals. The early 
congresses of the Concert can be seen as purposive efforts to advance 
the shared goal of monarchical rule, but they were also practical ef-
forts to presei;ve the European states system by promoting legitimate 
monarchy in most - but not all2 - countries. Nardin suggests that 
the Concert maintained an essentially practical character even late in 
its history, when theories of world community and shared goals were 
on the rise. He states that, "although it was colored by successive ver-
sions of the view that it existed to promote the shared purposes of its 
members, it never entirely shed its character as a forum for setting 
limits to the conduct of sovereign powers whose national pride, preoc-
cupation with security, and competitive rivalry stood as evidence of 
their divergent purposes" (p. 96). This descriptive passage seems close 
to Nardin's idea of what an important international organization 
should be. 
Nardin's treatment of the League of Nations and the United Na-
tions is more problematic, and his rather surprising conclusion that 
the United Nations represents a more radical departure from tradi-
tional forms of international relations than does the League relies too 
much on a very formal reading of the United Nations Charter. 
cording to which public offices are created, their lawful incumbents identified, and the scope of 
their jurisdiction delimited."). 
2. Nardin notes that the rights of nonmonarchical states like the Swiss Republic were pro· 
tected as well. See p. 89. 
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Nardin writes that the United Nations "is really an attempt to estab-
lish a new regime in which states, associated on the basis of an agree-
ment to pursue together certain specified substantive ends, will follow 
the directives of the body that is set up to organize the pursuit of these 
ends" (p. 107). Nardin may be right that such an attempt was made; 
five Secretaries-General would agree that it did not succeed. 
The heart of Nardin's book is his attempt to show that the practi-
cal conception of international society is compatible with traditional 
theories of international law. First, Nardin seeks to establish that in-
ternational law is law, arguing that legislation, enforcement, and a 
common judge are only contingent features of law and that their ap-
parent absence in the international system does not negate the exis-
tence or obligatory nature of international law. Yet Nardin's 
treatment of the problem of enforcement is disturbingly casual: 
First, we must dispose of what is now generally agreed to be the most 
egregious error made by Austin concerning the relation between enforce-
ment and law. . . . That one agent is able by force to compel another to 
act in a certain manner can hardly mean the first has right to demand 
such conduct, nor can it mean that the second has a duty or obligation to 
comply. . . . Coercion alone cannot create rights or obligations of any 
sort, legal or nonlegal. On the contrary, enforcement presupposes the 
validity of the law that is enforced. 3 
This is unpersuasive. It is not quite so clear that Austin was wrong 
that law must carry sanctions to be law, and Nardin's argument does 
not inspire confidence. Austin could reply that any sense of obligation 
to obey the law other than fear of sanction is a contingent feature of 
law, and that coercion does oblige a person to obey if she wishes to 
avoid the sanction. That is, law need not be morally binding to be 
considered "law." In any case, Nardin's argument that enforcement is 
not a sufficient condition for law - "Coercion alone cannot create 
rights" (p. 126) - does not prove that enforcement is not a necessary 
component. 
Nardin next attempts to delimit the specific character of the inter-
national legal system. He argues that international law is largely cus-
tomary law, created not intentionally but rather as "the indirect 
consequence of innumerable and substantively motivated acts, deci-
sions, and policies" (pp. 166-67). Empirical investigation and induc-
tive reasoning are needed to determine whether a particular norm is a 
valid international law: there is no "rule of recognition," in H.L.A. 
Hart's terms. According to Nardin, "Customary international law 
arises wherever there exists a general or uniform practice together 
with the general acceptance of this practice as law" (p. 167). 
There are two related problems with this conception of interna-
tional law. First, Nardin does not explain how international legal 
3. Pp. 125-26 (emphasis in original). 
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rules change.4 Second, Nardin's model will not be very helpful to 
someone who wants to predict whether particular acts of one country 
are likely to be accompanied by strong sanctions, weak sanctions, or 
no sanctions at all from the international community. The Soviet in-
vasion of Czechoslovakia was followed not by superpower confronta-
tion, but by the first stirrings of detente. The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan had very different consequences, and Nardin's model can-
not explain why.s 
Nardin ends his book with an argument for the moral superiority 
of the practical conception of international society. The fact that the 
rules and practices of international law are limited in number and 
scope allows the world's societies to remain diverse and encourages 
self-determination. Yet surely other values are lost. A system of inter-
national law premised on the formal equality of states that aims only 
to place a few restrictions on international conduct will do little to 
overcome the dire poverty of the developing countries and little to 
equalize the real power of nations. Perhaps it is unrealistic to suggest 
that the countries of the world can engage in a purposive association 
to bring about these changes, but Nardin comes uncomfortably close 
to justifying the status quo. 
4. Nardin writes: 
The rules of customary international law are a distillation of the constantly changing prac-
tices of states, and they reflect the collective will of the international community only in the 
sense that certain patterns of conduct from time to time attain a degree of acceptance suffi-
cient for them to be acknowledged as a distinct practice entitled to govern future conduct. 
P. 167. Nardin completely fails to explain how the changing practices of states attain this degree 
of acceptance or why accepted practices fall into disrepute. 
5. Both the problem of change and the likelihood of sanctions in the area of international 
relations are treated with sophistication by Professor Myres S. McDougal and his colleagues at 
the Yale Law School. See generally M. McDOUGAL, STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 
(1960); Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication (1981) (April 24, 
1981) (unpublished Harold D. Lasswell Memorial Lecture). 
